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Congress' Regulation of Intrastate, Noncommercial
Cultivation and Possession of Medicinal Marijuana
under the Controlled Substances Act is a
Constitutional Exercise of its Commerce Clause
Authority: Gonzales v. Raich
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - COMMERCE CLAUSE - CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCES ACT - REGULATION OF MEDICINAL MARIJUANA - The

Supreme Court held that Congress can regulate the intrastate,
noncommercial cultivation and possession of medicinal marijuana
through the Controlled Substances Act pursuant to its authority
under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.
Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S.Ct. 2195 (2005).
Congress enacted the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention
and Control Act of 19701 to consolidate existing federal drug legislation and to reinforce the national government's regulation of
illicit drugs.' Title II of this Act, the Controlled Substances Act
(hereinafter "CSA"), renders the manufacture, distribution, or
possession of marijuana a federal offense subject to criminal
prosecution.3 In 1996, California passed the Compassionate Use
Act, which legalized the use of marijuana within the state to treat
serious medical conditions.4 Respondents, California residents
1. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1971) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (2000)).
2. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2201, 2203 (2005).
3. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2203. The CSA classifies all controlled substances into five
categories, known as schedules, based on each drug's medicinal value, potential for abuse
and addiction, and effects on the body. 21 U.S.C. § 812(a)-(b). Drugs are subjected to various manufacturing, distribution, and use restrictions depending on which schedule they fall
into. See id. §§ 821-830. Marijuana is classified as a Schedule 1 substance due to its "high
potential for abuse, lack of any accepted medical use, and absence of any accepted safety for
use in medically supervised treatment." Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2204. See also 21 U.S.C. §§
812(b)(1), 812(c).
4. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2199. Section 11362.5(b) of the CALIFORNiA HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE (West Supp. 2005) states in relevant part:
Section 11357, relating to the possession of marijuana, and Section 11358, relating to the cultivation of marijuana, shall not apply to a patient, or to a patient's primary caregiver, who possesses or cultivates marijuana for the personal medical purposes of the patient upon the written or oral recommendation
or approval of a physician.
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Angel Raich and Diane Monson, use medicinal marijuana in accordance with the Compassionate Use Act to treat a host of severe
medical problems that have been unresponsive to traditional
medications.'
In August 2002, federal drug enforcement agents confiscated
and destroyed a small supply of medicinal marijuana plants grown
in Monson's home.6 Monson and Raich subsequently filed suit in
federal court against then-Attorney General of the United States,
John Ashcroft, and former Administrator of the Federal Drug Enforcement Administration, Asa Hutchinson.7 Monson and Raich
sought to enjoin the government from enforcing the CSA against
them insofar as it prevented them from growing and consuming
marijuana for private, medical purposes.8 They argued that applying the CSA in this situation would violate various constitutional
provisions; 9 specifically, they contended that Congress had no authority under the Commerce Clause" of the United States Constitution to regulate the purely intrastate, noncommercial cultivation
and possession of medicinal marijuana.1
The district court refused their request for injunctive relief on
the ground that Monson and Raich had failed to establish the
probability of success on their claims. 2 The Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding the case sufficiently distinguishable from its prior decisions upholding the CSA as a constiCAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(b).
5. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2199-2200. Specifically, Raich suffers from "an inoperable
brain tumor, life-threatening weight loss, a seizure disorder, nausea, and several chronic
pain disorders. Appellant Monson suffers from severe chronic back pain and constant,
painful muscle spasms . . . caused by a degenerative disease of the spine." Raich v.
Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 2003).
6. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2200.
7. Id. Only Monson's home was raided; Raich joined the suit based on the possibility
of future government seizures and of consequently "being deprived of medicinal marijuana." Raich, 352 F.3d at 1226.
8. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2200.
9. Id. "Respondents claimed that enforcing the CSA against them would violate the
...Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments of the
Constitution, and the doctrine of medical necessity." Id.
10. The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power to 'regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
11. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2204-05.
12. Raich v. Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 918, 920 (N.D. Cal. 2003). The court concluded
that "in the absence of an intervening Supreme Court decision," it was constrained to adhere to existing Ninth Circuit authority 'that Congress' findings [that the intrastate, noneconomic possession of controlled substances has a substantial effect on interstate commerce] are sufficient to overcome a Commerce Clause challenge. .. ." Raich, 248 F. Supp.
2d at 925-26.
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tutional exercise of federal commerce authority. 3 The court acknowledged that when the class of activities sought to be regulated is an appropriate object of federal governance, the judiciary
may not "excise, as trivial, individual instances of the class." 4 The
Ninth Circuit overcame this well-settled rule by determining that
Monson and Raich's activities were not the type of conduct intended to be regulated by the CSA (i.e., drug trafficking), but
rather constituted "a separate and distinct class of activities: the
intrastate, noncommercial cultivation and possession of cannabis
for personal medical purposes as recommended by a ... physician
pursuant to valid California state law." 5 The court went on to
conclude that this narrow class of activities had no substantial
impact on interstate commerce, using the four-factor test set forth6
by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Lopez
and United States v. Morrison.'"
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and the majority" held
that the CSA's general ban on the manufacture and possession of
marijuana can be constitutionally applied to the use of intrastate
medicinal marijuana under the power granted to Congress by the
Commerce Clause. 9 Justice Stevens, delivering the majority opinion of the Court, began by identifying the three types of regulatory
commerce power that Congress is constitutionally entitled to assume and noted that only the third category, the regulation of activities that substantially affect interstate commerce, is relevant
to the case.20

13. Raich, 352 F.3d at 1227.
14. Id. at 1228 (quoting Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971)).
15. Raich, 352 F.3d at 1228.
16. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
17. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). The four factors are 1) whether the statute regulates commerce or any sort of economic enterprise; 2) whether the statute contains any express jurisdictional element that might limit its reach to a discrete set of cases; 3) whether the statute
or its legislative history contains express congressional findings regarding the effects of the
regulated activity upon interstate commerce; and 4) whether the link between the regulated activity and a substantial effect on interstate commerce is attenuated. Morrison, 529
U.S. at 610-12.
18. The majority included Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.
Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2198.
19. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2201.
20. Id. at 2205. The first and second categories include the power to "regulate the
channels of interstate commerce" and the "authority to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and persons or things in interstate commerce." Id. (citing
Perez, 402 U.S. at 150).
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In Part III of the opinion,"1 the beginning of the substantive
analysis, the majority relied heavily on the Court's decision in
22 In Wickard,
Wickard v. Filburn.
a commercial farmer was fined
for harvesting an excess of wheat - to be consumed by his family
rather than sold - in violation of the Agricultural Adjustment Act
of 1938 (hereinafter "AAA"), 3 which attempted to stabilize wheat
prices by controlling the volume produced and released into the
commercial market.24 The Wickard Court found that while the
impact of Filburn's individual cache of wheat on the market was
minimal, his supply substantially affected interstate commerce
when aggregated with that of other farmers producing superfluous
wheat for personal use.25
Justice Stevens drew a close parallel between the Raich case
and Wickard. 6 The Court observed that both the CSA and the
AAA were passed to control the supply and demand of fungible
commodities. 7 Justice Stevens inferred that Congress, in failing
to exempt personal stores of wheat from regulation, reasonably
believed the existence of such quantities to have considerable effects on the grain's exchange in the open market. 8 Specifically,
Congress feared the diversion of excess wheat into the stream of
commerce, thus culminating in market saturation and price drops
that would hinder the stabilization efforts of the AAA." Justice
Stevens predicted that the high demand for marijuana may similarly lure homegrown medicinal supplies of cannabis into illicit
channels, thereby frustrating the CSA's object of eliminating the
drug's commercial trade altogether."
The Court next considered the three factors argued by Monson
and Raich to distinguish their case from Wickard.1 First, Monson
and Raich noted that the AAA explicitly exempted small farms
21. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2204. Part I of the opinion included a statement of the facts
and procedural history of the case. Id. at 2199-2201. Part Il discussed Congress' enactment of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970. Id. at 220104.
22. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
23. Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, ch. 30, 52 Stat. 31 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§
1281-1521 (2000)).
24. Wickard, 317 U.S. 111.
25. Id. at 127-28.
26. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2206.
27. Id. at 2206-07.
28. Id. at 2207.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2207.
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producing less than two hundred bushels of wheat from regulation, while the CSA contains no similar exception.3 2 Justice Stevens, however, failed to discern a connection between the government's decision to remove small farming operations from the
AAA's jurisdiction and its authority to control all aggregated activity having a substantial impact on interstate commerce.33
Monson and Raich's second argument - that the commercial
farm in Wickard constituted a "quintessential economic activity,"
while their use of medicinal marijuana involved no selling, buying,
or trading - was likewise found to be unpersuasive on the ground
that Filburn's private consumption of wheat was deemed by the
Wickard Court as noncommercial in nature, yet still subject to
regulation.3'
Third, Monson and Raich contended that the evidence in
Wickard clearly indicated that homegrown supplies of wheat had a
substantial effect on interstate commerce, while there is no such
concrete support for the similar assertion regarding locally cultivated medicinal marijuana." Justice Stevens responded to this
argument by referencing congressional findings that intrastate
drug activity does indeed affect interstate commerce." While the
Court conceded that these findings are not specific to the intrastate, noncommercial cultivation and possession of medicinal
marijuana, it concluded that "the absence of particularized findings does not call into question Congress' authority to legislate."3 7

32. Id. Filburn produced 460 bushels. Respondents' Brief in Opposition at 14, Raich,
125 S. Ct. 2195 (No. 03-1454).
33. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2207.
34. Id.
35. Id. The Wickard record established -that "on-site consumption [of homegrown
wheat] could have the effect of varying the amount of wheat sent to market by as much as
20%." Id. at 2227 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 2207-08 (majority opinion). Particularly, Congress found that:
(4) Local distribution and possession of controlled substances contribute to
swelling the interstate traffic in such substances.
(5) Controlled substances manufactured and distributed intrastate cannot be
differentiated from controlled substances manufactured and distributed interstate. Thus, it is not feasible to distinguish, in terms of controls, between controlled substances manufactured and distributed interstate and controlled substances manufactured and distributed intrastate.
(6) Federal control of the intrastate incidents of the traffic in controlled substances is essential to the effective control of the interstate incidents of such
traffic.
21 U.S.C. § 801(4)-(6).
37. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2208 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562; Perez, 402 U.S. at 156).
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In Part IV of the opinion, the majority examined the relevance
of two of the Court's most recent Commerce Clause decisions. 8 In
United States v. Lopez,3" the Court determined that the Gun-Free
School Zones Act, 4 which prohibited gun possession in school
zones, exceeded the government's Commerce Clause power.4 1
Likewise, in United States v. Morrison,42 the Court found no Commerce Clause basis for Congress' enactment of the Violence
Against Women Act of 1994, 4' which established a private right of
action for victims of violent crimes committed on the basis of gender."
Justice Stevens distinguished Lopez and Morrison on the
ground that neither case involved a comprehensive regulatory
scheme that would be seriously undermined by a failure to control
the regulated activity at the local level.45 Moreover, neither statute purported to regulate economic activity. 46 The CSA, on the
other hand, does regulate economic activity because it controls the
"production, distribution, and consumption of commodities for
which there is an established, and lucrative, interstate market."47
Next, Justice Stevens invalidated the court of appeals' conclusion that "the intrastate, noncommercial cultivation, possession
and use of marijuana for personal medical purposes on the advice
of a physician and in accordance with state law"48 constitutes a
separate class of activities beyond the reach of federal commerce
power and outside the realm of the CSA.49
First, the Court explained that the drug's medical use in this
case does not distinguish it from the rest of the activities controlled by the CSA because many of the substances included in the
Act have medicinal value." One of the primary purposes of the
CSA is to "regulate which controlled substances can be utilized for
38. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2209.
39. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
40. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(a) (2000).
41. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549.
42. 529 U.S. 598.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (2000).
44. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598.
45. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2209-10.
46. Id. at 2211.
47. Id. '"Economics' refers to 'the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities.' Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 720 (3d ed.
1966)).
48. Raich, 352 F.3d at 1229.
49. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2211.
50. Id. at 2211-12.
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medicinal purposes, and in what manner." 1 Congress answered
these questions with regard to marijuana by classifying it as a
Schedule 1 drug with no legitimate medical uses.5 2 Thus, Monson
and Raich's contention that marijuana is a medically beneficial
substance serves only to advance the argument that it should be
relegated to a less-restrictive schedule, as opposed to being left
completely unregulated by federal law.53
Second, the fact that Monson and Raich's use was "in accordance with state law" is of no consequence, due to the Supremacy
Clause's' command that federal laws trump conflicting state
laws.55 Monson and Raich argued that their activities were effectively isolated from the interstate market, thus warranting an
interpretation of the CSA that does not conflict with the Compassionate Use Act; however, Justice Stevens considered a number of
potential scenarios that demonstrate the opposite.5 For example,
unethical physicians may be financially induced to "overrecommend" marijuana treatment, given their exemption from
criminal prosecution and the lack of dosage and length of use restrictions that generally accompany traditional prescription
drugs.5 7 Additionally, the Court reasoned, it would be naive to
expect the production of marijuana purportedly cultivated for
medical purposes to "precisely match . . . medical needs" and
"promptly terminate when patients recover." 8 Far more likely is
the possibility that a significant percentage of the drug will seep
into the illicit market for recreational use.59
Thus, after eliminating as irrelevant the phrases "for personal
medical purposes on the advice of a physician" and "in accordance
with state law" from the class of activities as defined by the Ninth
Circuit, the Court concluded that what remains - "the intrastate,
noncommercial cultivation, possession and use of marijuana" - is
hardly "separate and distinct" from the illicit activities controlled

51. Id. at 2211.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 2211-12 n.37.
54. The Supremacy Clause states: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any . .. Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
55. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2212.
56. Id. at 2213-14.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 2214.
59. Id.
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by the CSA.6" Further, this category of activities, which encompasses recreational use of the drug, undoubtedly has a substantial
impact on the interstate market for marijuana.6 ' Accordingly, Justice Stevens held the CSA to be constitutionally valid under the
Commerce Clause and vacated the order of the court of appeals."
Justice Scalia filed a concurring opinion to discuss his "more
nuanced" understanding of Congress' commerce power.' He first
explained that the government's authority to regulate activities
that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce is derived
not only from the Commerce Clause but also from the Necessary
and Proper Clause of the United States Constitution." Thus,
while Congress may clearly enact laws to regulate intrastate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce, it may also
regulate intrastate activities that "do not themselves substantially
affect interstate commerce" when doing so is necessary and proper
to the effective regulation of interstate commerce."
This second category of regulation is identical to the power of
Congress, referred to in the majority opinion and enunciated in
Lopez, to regulate intrastate activity when a larger regulatory design would collapse without such local regulation in place." This
authority extends over even noneconomic activity if its governance
is critical to the success of a comprehensive regulatory scheme
involving interstate commerce.
Thus, although the activities in
Lopez and Morrison could have been lawfully regulated despite
being noneconomic and local in character, those cases were correctly decided because neither of the involved statutes was associated with a broader legislative system of commercial regulation."
Justice Scalia then applied these principles to the case at
hand.69 He determined that Congress has purported to regulate

60. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2215. See Raich, 352 F.3d at 1229.
61. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2212, 2215.
62. Id. at 2215.
63. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
64. Id. at 2215-16 (citing United States v. Coombs, 37 U.S. 72 (1838)). The Necessary
and Proper Clause states that Congress shall have the power to "make all laws necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested
by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,cl. 18.
65. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2216 (Scalia, J., concurring).
66. Id. at 2210 (majority opinion), 2217 (Scalia, J., concurring). See Lopez, 514 U.S. at
561.
67. Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2217 (Scalia, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 2218.
69. Id. at 2219.
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under the CSA intrastate activities that are both economic (manufacture and distribution) and noneconomic (possession) in nature."
Both types of activity may be regulated here because Congress has
"reasonably conclude[d] that its objective of prohibiting marijuana
from the interstate market could be undercut if those activities
were excepted from its general scheme of regulation."71 Justice
Scalia believed such a conclusion to be reasonable based on the
highly marketable nature of marijuana and the ease with which it
can slip into illicit channels.7"
Justices O'Connor and Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented. 3 Justice O'Connor wrote the first dissenting opinion,"
which opened with the observation that one of the most unique
features of federalism is the freedom it grants to the states to
"serve as . . . laborator[ies] and try novel social and economic ex75

periments without risk to the rest of the country."
The dissent immediately expressed concern that the majority's
ruling will encourage Congress to legislate broadly to insure that
any activity it desires to control is enmeshed in a larger regulatory
scheme of economic activity. Such an emphasis of form over substance threatens to render the "outer limits" of the Commerce
and intrudes upon well-settled notions of
Clause meaningless
77
state sovereignty.

Justice O'Connor defined the class of activities involved in this
case to be "the personal cultivation, possession, and use of marijuana for medicinal purposes." 78 This designation was believed to

be appropriate because it provides a balanced framework from
which to analyze Congress' regulatory action.79 The dissent then
70. Id.
71. Id. at 2220 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561).
72. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2219 (Scalia, J., concurring).
73. Id. at 2220.
74. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined as to all but Part III of
O'Connor's dissent. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2220 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas
then wrote a separate dissenting opinion. Id. at 2229 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
75. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262,
311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
76. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2221 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 2223.
78. Id. at 2224.
79. Id. at 2223-24. With regard to defining the class of activities in Commerce Clause
challenges, Justice O'Connor stated:
The hard work for courts, then, is to identify objective markers for confining
[W]e must look beyond responthe analysis in Commerce Clause cases ....
dents' own activities. Otherwise individual litigants could always exempt
themselves from Commerce Clause regulation merely by pointing to the obvi-
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turned to the questions of whether such activity can be characterized as economic, whether it substantially affects interstate commerce, and whether it is integral to a more comprehensive regulatory scheme. 0
Justice O'Connor first argued that the majority's definition of
economic activity - the production, distribution, and consumption
of commodities - is far too broad and theoretically encompasses all
"productive human activity.""1 That a private, noncommercial activity may have a commercial counterpart 2 does not make it economic for Commerce Clause purposes.83 Further, none of the marijuana in this case, nor any of the materials used to cultivate it,
ever moved between states; rather, all supplies were acquired and
plants produced within the State of California.' Finally, Justice
O'Connor rejected the notion that Wickard "impl[ies] that smallscale production is always economic, and automatically within
Congress' reach."'
The dissent then noted that federalism requires Congress to be
warranted in its belief that certain activity substantially affects
interstate commerce or is inextricably linked to a broader system
of interstate regulation before it can intrude upon areas typically
governed by state law.8" This is because the principles of state

ous - that their personal activities do not have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The task is to identify a mode of analysis that allows Congress to regulate more than nothing (by declining to reduce each case to its litigants) and less than everything (by declining to let Congress set the terms of
analysis). The analysis may not be the same in every case, for it depends on
the regulatory scheme at issue and the federalism concerns implicated.
Id. at 2223-24 (internal citations omitted). Justice O'Connor went on to note that an important objective marker in the present case is the existence of both federal and state laws
that distinguish between medical and non-medical uses of controlled substances. Id. at
2224.
80. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2224 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
81. Id.
82. For example, "[hiome care substitutes for daycare. Charades games substitute for
movie tickets. Backyard or windowsill gardening substitutes for going to the supermarket.
To draw the line wherever private activity affects the demand for market goods is to draw
no line at all, and to declare everything economic." Id. at 2225.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2225-26.
86. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2226 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). "[S]omething more than mere
assertion is required when Congress purports to have power over local activity whose connection to an interstate market is not self-evident." Id. Traditionally, states have retained
the power to "define the criminal law and to protect the health, safety and welfare of their
citizens." Id. at 2221 (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993); Whalen v.
Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603 n.30 (1977)).
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sovereignty embodied in the Tenth Amendments work to limit the
potentially sweeping effects of the Necessary and Proper Clause."
According to Justice O'Connor, sufficient justification for Congress' action was not present in this case."
Unlike the aggregated private wheat stores in Wickard, Justice
O'Connor found no concrete evidence that users of homegrown
medicinal marijuana are so numerous as to permit their activity to
have a noticeable impact on the interstate drug trade.' The dissent believed the congressional findings referenced by the majority
to be nebulous and vague; moreover, the existence of even detailed
findings that a particular activity influences interstate commerce
is not always dispositive of the issue.91 Finally, the dissent found
that because California has passed legislation establishing an
identification card system for medicinal marijuana users,92 and
because it is traditionally assumed that states enforce their own
laws, 93 there are no substantiated reasons to believe that the CSA
will be ineffective in regulating interstate drug traffic without
specific control of intrastate, medicinal marijuana.94
Justice Thomas began his separate dissent with the assertion
that Monson and Raich's activity could not be characterized as
either "interstate" or "commerce" and thus could not fall within
the reach of Congress' Commerce Clause authority.95 Moreover,
the regulation of their activity was neither necessary nor proper to
the execution of such commerce power and thus could not be justified under the Necessary and Proper Clause.96
The dissent noted that the word "commerce" has been traditionally understood to denote the exchange of goods and services for
value and any transportation thereby involved.97 There was no
such exchange or transportation in Raich, due to the fact that
87. The Tenth Amendment states: "The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
88. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2226 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 2227. See also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614; Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Association, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 311 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); Heart
of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 273 (1964) (Black, J., concurring).
92. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11362.715-11362.83 (West Supp. 2005).
93. See Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
94. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2228 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 2229 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 2229-30 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 585 (Thomas, J., concurring)).
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Monson grew her marijuana in her home and Raich was provided
with a gratuitous supply from her caregivers.98 Further, their activities were not "interstate" because their marijuana was cultivated and consumed entirely within the State of California.99
Thus, Justice Thomas concluded, Monson and Raich's personal
use of medicinal marijuana could not constitute interstate commerce.1oo
Justice Thomas next expounded on the role of the Necessary
and Proper Clause in this case. 1 ' He argued that necessity within
the meaning of the clause requires an "obvious, simple, and direct"
relationship between the intrastate prohibition of medicinal marijuana and the regulation of the drug's interstate market.0 2 Such a
relationship clearly exists when generally considering the local
cultivation, possession, and use of the drug; however, this case
involves the added distinction of marijuana used for medical purposes. 03 Thus, none of the "obvious" and "plain" rationales for
regulating non-medicinal intrastate marijuana' were applicable
to the matter at hand, due to California's effective legislative controls 0and
the extremely small number of medical users of the
5
drug.

Justice Thomas next considered whether Congress' enforcement
of the CSA against users of intrastate, medicinal marijuana would
be "proper" under the Necessary and Proper Clause.'
To be
proper, the measures taken by Congress to exercise its commerce
authority must not be forbidden by or "inconsistent with the 'letter
1 The dissent opined that regulatand spirit' of the Constitution."07
ing the conduct at issue in this case because of its connection with
a broader scheme of commercial regulation could lay the groundwork for Congress' intervention in a variety of "state police powers

98. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2200 (majority opinion), 2230 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 2230 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 2229-30.
101. Id. at 2230.
102. Id. at 2231 (citing Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 613 (2004) (Thomas, J.,
concurring); United States v. Dewitt, 76 U.S. 41, 44 (1870)).
103. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2231 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
104. Id. For example, "[ulnregulated local growers and users could swell both the supply
and demand sides of the interstate marijuana market, making the market more difficult to
regulate." Id.
105. Id. at 2232.
106. Id. at 2233.
107. Id. (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819)).
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under the guise of regulating commerce." °8 Such action would be
a contortion of the Necessary and Proper Clause to contravene the
ideologies of federalism and state sovereignty embodied in the
Constitution.1 "9
In Part Two of his dissent, Justice Thomas attacked each of the
three arguments propounded by the majority for enforcing the
CSA in the present case: 1) the activity, when viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce; 2) the regulation of the activity is crucial to the regulation of the overall drug
market; and 3) the regulation of the activity is incidental to the
regulation of the overall drug market."0
First, Justice Thomas rejected the majority's use of the "substantial effects" analysis, describing the test as both "rootless" and
"malleable.""' The label "rootless" was used because the "substantial effects" test is not based on the literal language of the Commerce Clause, which limits Congress' regulation to actual interstate commerce, rather than activities that substantially affect
interstate commerce." 2 Nor is the test rooted in the Necessary
and Proper Clause, which considers whether the regulation of the
activity is necessary to the regulation of interstate commerce, not
whether the activity has substantial effects on interstate commerce."' Justice Thomas accused the test of being "malleable"
because the majority was able to broadly define the class of activities in order to inflate its interstate effects." 4 By utilizing such an
easily manipulable standard, the majority essentially "rewrote"
the Commerce Clause.
Because Justice Thomas had already mentioned various reasons
why regulating medicinal marijuana is not essential to the overall
regulation of illicit drugs," 6 he moved on to the majority's some108 Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2233 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Morrison, 529 U.S. at
627 (Thomas, J., concurring)).
109. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2233-34 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 2234.
111. Id. at 2235 (citing Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627 (Thomas, J., concurring)).
112. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2235 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 2236.
116. Such reasons included California's identification card and registry system; the
Medical Board of California's practice of sanctioning physicians who do not comply with
marijuana recommendation guidelines; the relatively low number of medicinal marijuana
users and their average age of over forty; the reports of local police departments that medicinal marijuana has not weakened their efforts against illicit drug use; and the fact that
permitted medical use of other drugs controlled by the CSA has not undermined its overall
objectives. Id. at 2232-33.
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what contradictory claim that such regulation is constitutional
because it is incidental to the broader legislative design of the
CSA. 117 The majority rested this contention on the rule that individual and de minimis instances of conduct may not be overlooked
by courts in deciding whether to uphold attempted federal regulation where the conduct itself is part of a constitutionally regulable
class of activities.' 8 Yet if the conduct is not within a regulable
class of activities, as Justice Thomas believed had been demonstrated here, Congress has no commerce power to regulate it."9
Finally, the fact that regulation of the conduct may be incidental
to the regulation of an appropriate class of activities is not enough
to bring it within the purview of the Necessary and Proper Clause,
for that provision requires a more direct and interdependent relationship between the regulation of the two activities. 2 ° For all of
these reasons, Justice Thomas concluded, the majority erred in
reversing the decision of the court of appeals.'
As evidenced by the four very different opinions described
above, the Supreme Court has wrestled with the nebulous language of the Commerce Clause for the past 180 years. 22 Indeed,
judicial interpretation of this potentially limitless source of federal
legislative authority has played a large role in shaping modern
notions of federalism.'23 Charged with the demanding task of
drawing distinct lines between national and state regulatory
power in the face of ever-changing times and contexts, the Su-

117. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2237 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 2209 (majority opinion) (quoting Perez, 402 U.S. at 154).
119. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2237 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 2231, 2237.
121. Id. at 2239.
122. The Court's first major Commerce Clause case was Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1
(1824), in which the New York legislature granted a monopoly on steamship operation in
state waters to a private company, who then transferred that exclusive right to Ogden.
Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 1-2. Ogden sued Gibbons to enjoin him from running competing steamships between New York and New Jersey. Id. at 2. Gibbons, who had been acting pursuant to a license granted under federal law, claimed New York's actions violated the Commerce Clause. Id. at 2-3. The Court held that regulating navigation fell within the scope of
the government's commerce authority; thus, the federal law pre-empted the New York
statute. Id. at 189-90, 239-40 (Johnson, J., concurring). More important than the specific
question of navigation, however, was Chief Justice Marshall's expansive characterization of
the Commerce Clause power, noting that it "is complete in itself, may be exercised to its
utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution." Id. at 196 (majority opinion).
123. 1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE &4.1. at 398 (3d ed. 1999).
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preme Court has understandably fluctuated a great deal in defining the scope of the Commerce Clause.'2 4
For six decades following the 1824 landmark decision of Gibbons
v. Ogden,'25 in which Chief Justice Marshall broadly defined "commerce" to encompass steamboat navigation between two states,
judicial treatment of the Commerce Clause was relatively stable.'26
The Court routinely adhered to Marshall's demonstrated deference to the legislative branch and placed few restrictions on the
government's commerce power.127 The turn of the century era,
however, brought with it an onslaught of federal commercial regulation, which gave the Court ample opportunity to tighten its reins
on Congress by striking down measures it deemed excessive and
intrusive upon state matters.'
Yet the Court also rendered several decisions during this time period that would lay the groundwork for Gonzales v. Raich.'29 Most notably, it determined that
Congress may not only regulate, but may also prohibit activities
under its Commerce Clause authority, 30 and in the Shreveport
Rate Case, it held that purely intrastate transactions may be regulated where such control
is inextricably linked to the regulation of
3
interstate commerce.1 '
124. Id. See also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 568-69 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
125. 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
126. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 123, § 4.4, at 415. "'Relatively little emerges up to
the death of [Chief Justice] Waite in 1888, regarding the Court's attitude towards the commerce clause as an affirmative instrument for promoting 'commerce among the states.' ...
And so it was, because Congress passed little commercial legislation during this period and
the Supreme Court reviewed even less." Id. (quoting FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE
CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND WAITE 7 (Quadrangle Books 1964) (1937)).
127. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 123, § 4.4, at 418.
128. Id. § 4.6, at 424-32. For example, the Court held in United States v. E.C. Knight
Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895), that regulation of intrastate manufacturing was beyond the reach of
the government's commerce power and that a monopoly having only "indirect" effects on
interstate commerce could not be controlled by the Sherman Antitrust Act. 156 U.S. at 1213, 16-17. In Hammer v. Dagenhart,the Court concluded that regulating conditions of
production was a matter for state law and that the government could not circumvent this
rule by purporting to regulate the transportationof goods manufactured by factories engaging in child labor. 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100(1941).
129. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2207 n.29, 2218 (Scalia, J., concurring).
130. Champion v. Ames (The Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321, 357-58 (1903) (upholding a
federal ban on lottery ticket traffic in interstate commerce).
131. Houston, East & West Texas Ry. v. United States (The Shreveport Rate Case), 234
U.S. 342, 351-52 (1914) (holding that Congress, via the Interstate Commerce Commission,
could constitutionally regulate intrastaterailroad rates in order to prevent railroad companies from discriminating against interstate transport, and thereby, interstate commerce).
This intrastate regulation was limited, however, to railroad regulation cases. ROTUNDA &
NOWAK, supra note 123, § 4.6, at 432-33.
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The Court began to significantly curb Congress' commerce
power after the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1932.32 For
the next five years, the Court quashed a large percentage of Roosevelt's New Deal legislation on the ground that it exceeded the
scope of the Commerce Clause, 33 thus provoking the former president to retaliate with his now infamous Court Packing Plan.3
While the plan did not go through, the Court appeared to take the
threat seriously by returning to its former pattern of broad interpretation of the Commerce Clause to uphold extensive federal

commercial legislation. 131
The first Commerce Clause case decided by the "reformed"
Court was NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,36 which involved the government's enactment of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (hereinafter "the Act")3 7 to eliminate obstructions to interstate commerce caused by unfair labor practices. 8 In
the majority opinion, Chief Justice Hughes departed from traditional theories used by the Court to analyze Commerce Clause
challenges3 9 and instead concocted early versions of the "substan132. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supranote 123, § 4.7, at 433.
133. Some of the federal laws invalidated by the Court during this time period include
the Railroad Retirement Act of 1934 (in Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton RailroadCo.,
295 U.S. 330 (1935)); the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 (in ALA. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)); and the Bituminous Coal Conservation
Act of 1935 (in Carterv. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936)). ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra
note 123, at 433-36.
134. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 123, § 4.7, at 437-38. Roosevelt proposed the appointment of an additional judge for every federal judge over the age of 70 who had served
on a court for at least ten years. Id. at 438. According to this plan, six additions would be
made to the United States Supreme Court, raising the total number of justices to fifteen.
Id. In response to this proposal, the justices began voting more uniformly to uphold federal
legislation, thus forming a new majority more favorable towards a far-reaching federal
commerce power. Id. The Court's change of heart is commonly referred to as "the switch in
time that saved nine." RONALD D. ROTUNDA, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND
NOTES 192 (7th ed. 2003).
135. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 123, § 4.7, at 438. Rotunda points out, however,
that the switch may not have been purely the result of presidential pressure; rather, the
Court may have been responding to the severe social and economic crises occurring at the
time. Id.
136. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
137. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
138. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 22-23. The National Labor Relations Board,
created by the Act to enforce its provisions, found the Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. guilty
of dismissing employees because of their participation in union activity and sought assistance from the Circuit Court of Appeals when the company failed to comply with remedial
orders. Id. at 22. The court refused to enforce the orders on the ground that they exceeded
federal authority. Id.
139. Such theories included the "stream of commerce" analysis utilized by Justice
Holmes in Swift & Co. v. United States, which permitted the regulation of intrastate activity that is "but a temporary stop . . . 'in a current of commerce among the States.'
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tial effects" and "necessary and proper" tests by drawing from the
language of the statute itself and expanding the holding in the
Shreveport Rate Case.1"
In response to arguments that the Act's goal was to bring all industrial labor relations within federal control, Chief Justice
Hughes pointed to the Act's definition of "affecting commerce."""
By limiting the Act's provisions to those labor practices "burdening or obstructing commerce ... or having led or tending to lead to
a labor dispute burdening or obstructing commerce,""' Congress
legislated within its "constitutional bounds.""" Citing the Shreveport Rate Case and other railroad cases as examples, the Court
acknowledged that "although activities may be intrastate in character ... if they have such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to
protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress
cannot be denied the power to exercise that control."1" Here, the
Court concluded, any interruption in the steel company's operations due to labor disagreements could have "catastrophic" effects
on commerce in several states.'45 Thus, the Act was necessary in
order to prevent potentially severe repercussions in the interstate
marketplace. 4 '
Four years later, the "substantial effects" test was emphatically
affirmed in United States v. Darby,'47 which abandoned the previROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 123, § 4.6, at 427 (quoting Swift, 196 U.S. 375, 398-99
(1905)). The Court had also previously distinguished between federal legislation that regulated the commercial trade of goods, as opposed to their production or manufacture, as well
as between activities that had a direct versus indirect effect on commerce. See supra note
128 and accompanying text; Carter, 298 U.S. 238, 301 ("That commodities produced or
manufactured within a state are intended to be sold or transported outside the state does
not render their production or manufacture subject to federal regulation under the commerce clause."); Schechter, 295 U.S. 495, 546 ("[W]here the effect of intrastate transactions
upon interstate commerce is merely indirect, such transactions remain within the domain
of state power.").
140. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
141. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 31.
142. 29 U.S.C. § 152(7).
143. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 31.
144. Id. at 37 (citing Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. 495).
145. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 41.
146. Id.
147. 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941). The Darby Court upheld a prohibition against shipment
in interstate commerce of goods produced by manufacturers who failed to comply with
federal wage and hour requirements. Darby, 312 U.S. at 109. With regard to the "substantial effects" test, the Court stated:
The power of Congress over interstate commerce is not confined to the regulation of commerce among the states. It extends to those activities intrastate
which so affect interstate commerce ... as to make regulation of them appro-
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ously relied upon "direct-indirect effects" and "productioncommerce" distinctions, reduced the Tenth Amendment to a mere
4
"truism,"148 and overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart.1
' The Court's
rejection of its claim in Hammer that the congressional motive
behind a particular provision "can operate to deprive the regulation of its constitutional authority" would pave the way for future
cases upholding legislation that had been promulgated for the
primary purpose of eliminating racial discrimination, rather than
regulating commerce."'
In United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co.,"' the Court refined
the "necessary and proper" test alluded to in the Shreveport Rate
Case and Jones & Laughlin Steel."2 In approving the application
of federal milk regulations to milk produced and sold purely intrastate, the Court relied on the fact that failure to control such milk
would impede the government's statutory regulation of milk moving through the channels of interstate commerce." 3 Chief Justice
Stone noted that "Congress plainly has the power to regulate the
price of milk distributed through . . .interstate commerce and it
possesses every power needed to make that regulation effective."" 4
Because competition between intrastate and interstate milk led to
interference with Congress' price regulation of the latter, the

priate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the exercise of the granted
power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.
Id. at 118. The Court then deferred to legislative findings that "competition in the distribution of goods produced under substandard labor conditions... is injurious to the commerce
and to the states from and to which the commerce flows." Id. at 115.
148. Id. at 123-24. The Court stated:
Our conclusion is unaffected by the Tenth Amendment which... states but a
truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered. There is nothing in
the history of its adoption to suggest that it was more than declaratory of the
relationship between the national and state governments as it had been established by the Constitution before the amendment or that its purpose was other
than to allay fears that the new national government might seek to exercise
powers not granted, and that the states might not be able to exercise fully their
reserved powers.
Id.
149. Darby, 312 U.S. at 116-18 (citing Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918)). See
supra note 128 and accompanying text.
150. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
151. 315 U.S. 110 (1942).
152. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 123, § 4.9, at 449.
153. Wrightwood Dairy, 315 U.S. at 120-21.
154. Id. at 118-19 (citing United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative, Inc., 307 U.S. 533
(1939)).
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Court concluded that155
control of the former was necessary to effectuate the federal law.
Several months after Wrightwood Dairy, the Court decided
Wickard v. Filburn."6 Wickard involved a scenario much like the
one presented in Gonzales v. Raich - the attempted governmental
regulation of wheat grown for personal consumption.157 Filburn
contended that his activities could not be regulated pursuant to
any "substantial effects" theory of Commerce Clause jurisprudence
because his private cache of wheat was too small to have any
measurable impact on the flow of wheat in the open market.'
The Court used this as an opportunity to expand the "substantial
effects" test to include small-scale activities which, when combined
with the operations of others on a similar scale, substantially affected interstate commerce.
Thus, Congress could constitutionally regulate personal supplies of wheat because, when viewed in
the aggregate, such supplies competed with commercial wheat and
threatened to drive down prices by seeping into the interstate
market. 6 °
The Court in Wickard demonstrated great deference to congressional findings that the activity sought to be regulated substantially affected interstate commerce, but the Supreme Court would
soon decide that official findings are not a necessary component of
the "substantial effects" test.' In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 62 the Court dealt with the constitutionality of Title
II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited racial dis-

crimination in public establishments such as restaurants and hotels.' While Congress' motive in passing the bill was the obliteration of racial discrimination, the legislation was promulgated as
an exercise of the federal commerce power."' Because this case
involved a purely intrastate activity - the operation of one motel
within a single state - the Court was required to determine
155. Wrightwood Dairy, 315 U.S. at 120-21.
156. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
157. Wickard, 317 U.S. 111.
158. Id. at 119.
159. Id. at 127-28.
160. Id. at 128.
161. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 123, § 4.10(b), at 460.
162. 379 U.S. 241.
163. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
2000a-h) (2000)).
164. Heart ofAtlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 247.
165. Id. at 250.
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whether the motel's discriminatory
practices substantially af166
fected interstate commerce.
Writing for the majority, Justice Clark noted that Title II was
not accompanied by any formal congressional findings to the effect
that racial discrimination in public establishments adversely impacted interstate commerce.1 67 However, the Court's job was not to
search out proof of such a relationship, but rather to determine
whether Congress had a "rational basis" for concluding that the
activity affected commerce to such a degree as to justify Commerce
Clause action. 8' After establishing that such a basis existed, said
the Court, the only question left to be determined was whether the
"means . .. selected [by Congress] to eliminate that evil are reasonable and appropriate," or rather, whether they are "reasonably
adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution." 69
In adopting such a deferential standard, the Court set the stage
for nearly thirty years of consistent judicial enforcement of federal
commercial legislation."70 During this time, the Court permitted
Congress to regulate anyone or anything moving across state
lines, including the power to prohibit outright such interstate
travel or shipment, as long as the legislation was otherwise constitutional.171 Congress was also authorized to regulate any intrastate activity having a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 72
This second category included activities regulated pursuant to the
Wickard "cumulative effects" standard, as well as those encompassed by Wrightwood Dairy's "necessary and proper" analysis.172
Further, Heart of Atlanta's "rational basis" test remained the
measure by which intrastate activities were deemed to have a relation to interstate commerce sufficient to render them within
congressional reach. 7 4
166. Id. at 258.
167. Id. at 252.
168. Id. at 258. The Court found such a rational basis in this case. Id. at 252-53. Relying on testimony presented during the passage of the statute, the Court concluded that
discrimination in public accommodations had the effect of discouraging African-Americans
from traveling out of state, which could reasonably be viewed as an obstruction to interstate commerce. Id. See also Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 303-04 ("[W]here we find that the
legislators, in light of the facts and testimony before them, have a rational basis for finding
a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of commerce, our investigation is at
an end.").
169. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 258.
170. DAN T. COENEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 63 (2004).
171. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 123, § 4.8, at 439-41.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 441.
174. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2208-09.
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In 1995, the Court struck down a piece of Commerce Clause legislation for the first time in decades, and, in so doing, subtly refined and narrowed both the scope of Congress' power and the judiciary's interpretive tests.7 5 United States v. Lopez involved the
regulation of the intrastate, noncommercial possession of a firearm in a school zone.' The petitioner was charged with such possession and prosecuted under the federal Gun-Free School Zones
Act of 1990,177 which he subsequently challenged as an unconstitutional exercise of the government's Commerce Clause authority.
Chief Justice Rehnquist first articulated the three categories of
activities that Congress had been empowered to govern under the
Commerce Clause since Jones & Laughlin Steel: 1) the use of the
channels of interstate commerce; 2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, including persons or things moving through interstate commerce; and 3) activities that substantially affect interstate commerce."' With respect to the third category, which
encompassed the gun possession at issue in Lopez, the Court broke
the "substantial effects" test into four components, focusing first
on whether the activity sought to be regulated could be characterized as economic or commercial in nature.8 0
The Court distinguished precedents such as Wickard and Heart
of Atlanta on the ground that such cases involved "economic activity in a way that possession of a gun in a school zone does not." 8 '
Rather, the statute in Lopez purported to regulate a criminal activity that had no connection to any economic endeavor or operation. 8 2 Moreover, the regulation could not be saved under a "necessary and proper" analysis, as it was not a crucial8 3component of a
larger regulatory scheme of commercial activities.'

175. COENEN, supra note 170, at 63, 101-05.
176. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549.
177. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(a) (2000).
178. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552.
179. Id. at 558-59. Regulating the use of channels of interstate commerce involves keeping them "free from immoral and injurious uses." Id. at 558 (quoting Heart of Atlanta, 379
U.S. at 256). Examples of "instrumentalities" of interstate commerce include railroads,
telecommunications facilities, airport operations, and natural gas pipelines. COENEN,
supranote 170, at 64 n.2.
180. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-60.
181. Id. at 560.
182. Id. at 561.
183. Id.
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The Court next noted the absence of a "jurisdictional element84
which would ensure, through a case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question affects interstate commerce," as well
as the lack of any congressional findings that could demonstrate a
link between firearm possession in schools and interstate commerce. 5 While Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that official findings had not been required since Heart of Atlanta Motel,
he alluded that their presence would be beneficial in analyzing
situations involving intrastate, noneconomic activities that have
no readily apparent relation to interstate commerce.186
Finally, the Court rejected the government's argument that gun
possession in school zones substantially interferes with the educational process, thus producing a less capable workforce, which in
turn adversely affects interstate commerce. 7 Chief Justice
Rehnquist deemed this connection to be too attenuated and reasoned that the government's logic would have the effect of extending federal commerce power over any activity found to reduce the
"economic productivity of individual citizens.""'s By this rationale,
Congress could regulate traditionally state-governed matters such
as divorce and child custody, as well as education as a whole.' 9
While it may be argued that such activities do indeed substantially affect interstate commerce when viewed in the aggregate,
thus seemingly bringing them within the holding of Wickard, the
In this
critical difference lies in their noneconomic nature.'
manner, then, the Court appeared to narrow the "substantial effects" category to encompass only those intrastate activities with a
commercial or economic root. ''

184. A jurisdictional element is a "provision in a federal statute that requires the government to establish specific facts justifying the exercise of federal jurisdiction in connection with any individual application of the statute." United States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d 465,
471 (3d Cir. 1999).
185. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-62.
186. Id. at 562-63.
187. Id. at 563-64.
188. Id. at 564.
189. Id. at 564-65.
190. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564-66. See also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-16.
191. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 123, § 4.9, at 457-58. Chief Justice Rehnquist
acknowledged, however, that characterizing an activity as either economic or noneconomic
will at times be difficult, stating:
Admittedly, a determination whether an intrastate activity is commercial or
noncommercial may in some cases result in legal uncertainty. But so long as
Congress' authority is limited to those powers enumerated in the Constitution,
and so long as those enumerated powers are interpreted as having judicially

Winter 2006

Gonzales v. Raich

357

Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion,'9 2 which included an
exhaustive summary of the evidence tending to prove a link between gun possession in schools and interstate commerce. 193 Specifically, however, Justice Breyer disagreed with the majority's
focus on the economic or noneconomic character of the activity at
issue, expressing his belief that the Constitution would not "distinguish between two local activities, each... ha[ving] an identical effect upon interstate commerce, if one, but not the other, is
'commercial' in nature."194 Such a distinction, Justice Breyer believed, could not be reconciled with the earlier holdings of
Wickard, Heart of Atlanta, Katzenbach v. McClung,'9 5 and Perez v.
United States,96 which were not concerned with the commercial or
noncommercial nature of the activities involved, but rather with
the extent of their effects on interstate commerce.'97 Moreover, the
dissent noted, none of the activities at issue in these prior cases
(i.e., consumption of wheat, racial discrimination, the use of force
in debt collection) were by themselves any more "economic" or
"commercial" than a single instance of gun possession in a school
zone.9' Justice Breyer concluded that in order to faithfully apply
Wickard, the Court must look beyond the activity as it stands
alone to the broader picture of how it affects interstate commerce.199
Five years after Lopez, the Court affirmed its four-part "substantial effects" test in United States v. Morrison,"'° which involved a federal law creating a private cause of action for victims

enforceable outer limits, congressional legislation under the Commerce Clause
will always engender "legal uncertainty."
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566.
192. The dissent was joined by Justices Souter, Stevens and Ginsburg. Lopez, 514 U.S.
at 615 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justices Stevens and Souter also filed separate dissenting
opinions. Id. at 602 (Stevens, J., dissenting), 603 (Souter, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 619-22 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer provided statistics of the high
incidence of gun violence in schools and presented evidence that such violence negatively
impacts education by increasing drop-out rates and causing victims to under-achieve academically. Id. at 619. He then chronicled the historical association between the educational process and employment and discussed the effects of a poorly trained workforce on
the nation's economy in light of current phenomena such as outsourcing and global competition. Id. at 620-22.
194. Id. at 627.
195. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
196. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
195. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 627 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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of violent, gender-motivated crime. ' Here again, the Court found
no economic aspect to the criminal activity covered by the statute,
nor any jurisdictional element that might limit its application to
specific instances clearly involving interstate commerce.0 2 Unlike
Lopez, however, the statute included express congressional findings regarding the effects of gender-based crime on the national
economic landscape:2 3
Rather than merely accepting Congress' determinations as having had a "rational basis," the Court concluded that such findings
were entitled to little deference for two primary reasons: 1) the
statute involved the regulation of a single-state, noneconomic activity,"4 and 2) the congressional findings relied on the same type
of chain-reaction reasoning previously rejected by the Court in
Lopez.2 °5 The findings alleged, and the government argued, that
gender-based violence discouraged women from traveling and conducting business interstate, increased medical costs, and weakened national productivity, all of which led to substantial interference with interstate commerce.2 6 Again, the Court rejected such
reasoning as having no defined boundaries, as it would allow Congress to regulate "family law and other areas of traditional state
regulation since the aggregate effect of marriage, divorce, and
on the national economy is undoubtedly significhildrearing
20 7
cant."

Thus, after Lopez and Morrison, the Court was willing to apply
the "substantial effects" test - including the aggregation principle
set forth in Wickard and the Heart of Atlanta "rational basis"
standard - only when 1) the federal law regulated intrastate activity that was sufficiently economic in nature or 2) control of the
intrastate conduct was necessary for the regulation of a larger
class of interstate economic activities.2 ' But when the activity
bore no relation to any economic endeavor, the Court appeared
reluctant to extend federal jurisdiction unless Congress could
199. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (2000).
200. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613.
201. Id. at 614.
202. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 123, § 4.9, at 457-58.
203. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 615-16. The dissenters in Lopez also disagreed with the Morrison decision
and continued to question "why ... critical constitutional importance [should be given] to
the economic, or noneconomic nature of an interstate-commerce-affecting cause." Id. at 657
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
206. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 123, § 4.9, at 457-58.
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demonstrate a strong factual, rather than merely "rational," basis
for the need. °9
The interplay of these theories thus set the stage for the controversial decision in Gonzales v. Raich. Yet Raich was made even
more difficult by the direct human consequences that would accompany a ruling in favor of the government. 2" By extending congressional authority over the intrastate, noncommercial use of
medicinal marijuana, the Supreme Court was well aware that it
was subjecting many seriously ill Californians and citizens of
other states to potential federal prosecution for engaging in the
only form of therapy capable of relieving their pain. 21' The majority understood, however, that despite the name of the California
statute, this case was not about compassion, but about the Commerce Clause.2 2 Thus, the Court remained true to its duty to render a decision in accordance with precedent and established constitutional principles. 3
The Court faithfully adhered to the "substantial effects" test as
it currently stood after sixty years of molding and refinement.
The liberal doctrines embodied in early "modern" cases like
Wickard, Wrightwood Dairy, and Heart of Atlanta were applied in
perfect harmony against the more conservative backdrop of Lopez
and Morrison. Raich indeed involved the attempted regulation of
a purely intrastate and noncommercial activity, but the majority
understood that nothing in the Court's recent jurisprudence required the analysis to stop there.214 Rather, the Court properly
took into account the fact that the activity, when viewed in the
aggregate, substantially affected interstate commerce, that the
regulation of such marijuana was crucial to the government's enforcement of the CSA, and that Congress had a rational basis for
coming to both of these conclusions. 5
The Court's decisions in Lopez and Morrison did not preclude
the result reached in Raich. While those cases certainly took a
more limiting view of the Commerce Clause with respect to the
pure "substantial effects" test, insofar as intrastate activities that
affect interstate commerce were required to be commercial or eco207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id. at 459.
Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2201.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2209.
Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2207, 2211.
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nomic in nature before they could be federally regulated, Lopez
and Morrison left intact the "necessary and proper" extension of
that test. 16 The Raich majority correctly noted that the presence
of a broader statutory scheme of regulation, which could be weakened by a lack of enforcement against certain subclasses of activities, was an important distinguishing factor between the circum2 17
stances of Raich and those of Lopez and Morrison.
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion also relied on the fact that
the Court "implicitly acknowledged in Lopez.. . [that] Congress's
authority to enact laws necessary and proper for the regulation of
interstate commerce is not limited to laws directed against economic activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce."2 18 Indeed, "though the conduct in Lopez was not economic,
the Court nevertheless recognized that it could be regulated as 'an
essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which
the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated."2 19
In a perhaps more accurate reflection of the issues presented in
Raich and the current state of Commerce Clause theory, Justice
Scalia's opinion was not bogged down by the "economicnoneconomic" distinction. Such an inquiry is undoubtedly important where, as in Lopez, the federal statute under scrutiny concerns only a single activity, such as gun possession in a school
zone, and is constitutionally challenged as a whole - i.e., the entire statute is claimed to exceed the scope of the Commerce
Clause.22 ° In such cases, the question of whether the statute purports to regulate economic activity is identical to the question of
whether the activity sought to be regulated is economic in nature.
According to Lopez and Morrison, the same rule applies no matter
how the question is phrased: the activity must be economic in order to be subject to federal regulation under the "substantial effects" test of the Commerce Clause.221
However, where, as in Raich, the federal law is alleged to be unconstitutional as applied only to a specific subgroup of the class of
activities covered by the statute, the "economic-noneconomic" distinction falls to the wayside. In these cases, the government's de214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Id. at 2218 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 2209-10 (majority opinion).
Id. at 2217 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561).
Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2209 (majority opinion).
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560-61; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610.
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fense of the legislation will virtually always involve a "necessary
and proper" type of argument, or rather, a contention that regulation of the subclass of activities is necessary to give meaningful
regulatory effect to the entire statute. When such an argument is
made, the pivotal question is not whether the activity sought to be
regulated is economic in nature, but whether its control is truly
essential to the regulation of the broader class of activities (or,
more specifically, whether Congress had a "rational basis" for so
concluding). The question of whether the overall statutory scheme
regulates economic activity becomes an entirely different query
from the issue of whether the specific conduct underlying the controversy can be characterized as economic. Moreover, the former
question is not likely to arise, as the statute's general constitutionality under the Commerce Clause has not been attacked.
Thus, the majority's discussion of the CSA's regulation of economic activity was unnecessary, as neither Monson nor Raich had
contended that the CSA, as generally applied, was an unconstitutional attempt to regulate noneconomic conduct.22 2
Justice
O'Connor's dissent correctly pointed out that the majority had
shifted its focus from the economic nature of "the activity at issue.
. . to the entirety of what the CSA regulates," but again, neither
inquiry is relevant when conducting a necessary and proper
analysis.2 ' Because of this, the most persuasive element of the
majority's opinion was its discernment of a "rational basis" upon
which Congress had concluded that regulation of intrastate, medicinal marijuana is necessary to effectively enforce the CSA.224
Conversely, the most compelling part of Justice O'Connor's dissent
was her rejection of the arguments in support of such a basis.225
Raich will almost certainly stand for the Court's affirmance and
refinement of the "necessary and proper" theory of Commerce
Clause jurisprudence. The four-factor test utilized in Lopez and
Morrison is still a valid standard for dealing with activity that
either by itself or in the aggregate substantially affects interstate
commerce, but where regulation of the conduct is not essential to a
comprehensive regulatory scheme. The test will not be used, however, in cases involving regulation that is claimed to be necessary
220. "Respondents in this case do not dispute that passage of the CSA, as part of the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, was well within Congress' commerce power." Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2204.
221. Id. at 2224 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565).
222. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2207, 2213-14.
223. Id. at 2226, 2228 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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and proper to broader commercial legislation. In such situations,
significant attention will not be given to the economic or noneconomic nature of the specific activity at issue because "Congress
may regulate even noneconomic local activity if that regulation is
a necessary part of a more general regulation of interstate commerce."226 Nor will the Court be concerned with a lack of particularized congressional findings on the matter as long as it is determined that there was a rational basis for Congress' exercise of authority. As Justice Scalia pointed out, the natural safeguards
built in to this mode of analysis will prevent the Necessary and
Proper Clause from becoming "a back door for unconstitutional
legislation."2 27
Returning now to the human costs of the case, it is likely that
many of the nation's citizens, both conservatives and liberals, will
continue to lament the Raich decision as an unconscionable federal intrusion into the private affairs of the seriously ill. Yet the
solution to this problem does not lie in artificially restraining the
government's established Commerce Clause power. Rather, Congress should take note of the potentially dire medical and social
impacts of allowing federal agents to arrest and prosecute medicinal marijuana users and reconsider the drug's classification as a
2
Schedule 1 substance."
Relegating marijuana to a less restrictive
category would enable those who need to use and obtain it for
medical purposes to do so without fear of criminal charges, while
still allowing the federal government to maintain strict control of
its manufacture, possession, and distribution.
The congressional findings deferred to by the Raich Court are
certainly not the be-all or end-all of the matter. Even Congress is
free to change its mind in light of new research and information,
and it may do so with regard to medicinal marijuana without altering the scope of its Commerce Clause power.
Emily K Nicholson
224. Id. at 2217 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561).
225. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2226 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia noted that "the
power to enact laws enabling effective regulation of interstate commerce can only be exercised in conjunction with congressional regulation of an interstate market, and it extends
only to those measures necessary to make the interstate regulation effective." Id. at 2218
(Scalia, J., concurring). Further, "even when the end is constitutional and legitimate, the
means must be 'appropriate' and 'plainly adapted' to that end... [and] 'must be consistent
with the letter and spirit of the constitution." Id. at 2219 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421).
226. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2215 (majority opinion).

